Wikileaks, Transparency, Responsibility, and Constructive Action

We’ve been having a really great conversation about the recent WikiLeaks incident on an informal Fletcherite group list, and I wanted to get some of the thoughts up that have been spiraling about, as well as refine my own thoughts.  For those I mention below, if they’ve got a blog, they’re well worth the follow so I suggest doing so!

My biggest issue with this situation from the get go was whether or not this leak was handled in a responsible and constructive manner.  I don’t think it was. I am in complete support of transparency and open government and all those high-aspiring concepts we work so hard for (especially in the digital activism field).

However, I feel there are effective ways to accomplish this, and ineffective ways. This, in my opinion, was an ineffective way.

In our conversation stream, the first question I brought up was something to the effect of…”This isn’t everyday information, and while I feel the government should be more transparent, I also wonder what level of expertise Julien has with that sort of information and *everything* (consequences, people involved, military structure, etc) included with it.  Did he actually do a “responsible” vetting process before leaking, to the point where military info could be appropriately consumed by the public, the regular Joe, in a constructive, non-agenda-based way?

I always try to push the responsibility aspect of issues like this, as I think it works better than willy-nilly throwing around of information for sensationalist purposes….soap-boxers and dramatic whistle blowers don’t strike a chord with me very often in a situation like this, and it’s very clear that Assange and WikiLeaks had an agenda they were trying to push.  This means that it wasn’t about transparency anymore, it was about an agenda.  This is further supported by the fact that the original source of the information has essentially said that the leak was not for the purposes of broad-based transparency… it’s because he himself had become disillusioned with the war he was involved in, he didn’t like his position, and he wanted to “strike back.”  Even people close to the course felt compelled to bring the original leak to the government’s attention because of the way it was handled…

Carol Waters said it very well in our email discussions:

“I’ve been a fan and supporter of Wikileaks since its inception in 2007, and I still strongly believe that it occupies a critical space for information that needs to see the light of day.  But the biggest issue right now –embodied in the current case of Wikileaks– is the establishment of a code of conduct as leaks and transparency become more and more common over the next few decades.

I’m concerned with the direction WikiLeaks has taken recently — the site’s power resides in its stateless existence, but this is also its greatest weakness, for it chooses its own code of accountability.  And now that WikiLeaks has received so much attention as the new hip place to break dirty-dirt on various governments, organizations, corporations, individuals, and movements, this is an even greater issue.

When Assange released the video of the bombing a few months ago and titled it “Collateral Murder,” he lost me as a supporter.  Not because I disagreed with his sentiment that the acts in the video were murderous in nature, but because it showed that Assange was going overt with his political editorialization of the material on the site, and I couldn’t trust his judgment any more.  Not because he stamped his opinion and politics on the video in such a bald manner, but because it implied something more serious and dangerous in my eyes: selective leaks to serve political agendas, taking the culture of wiki away from the site. Selective political leaking has always been an issue, but I can no longer view WikiLeaks choices of leaked material as anything other than deeply politicized, and I find this a sad element in Assange’s recent decisions.

I agree that “official” journalists shouldn’t have the exclusive stamp of legitimacy in the realm of “fair and balanced” reporting, and I think transparency is good and preferred (albeit with some heavy caveats), but I think when Assange only chooses to leak documents that promote his political beliefs and agendas, he becomes a variant of a cleverly edited cable news show, be it Jon Stewart or Fox.  What’s disappointing is that whistleblowing and “leaks for good” still have a positive connotation, but Assange’s choices and contextualizations may change that, throwing all of it into a barrel labeled infowar or counterintelligence as we move into the future.”

If Assange/WikiLeaks had firstly done a more thorough job of sifting through the information – really curating it for the readers he was trying to reach – and been more sensitive of that information (it’s generally agreed that the amount of time that was spent on this process was not nearly enough…), I might be ok with it.

If he had also presented it in a way that was more compelling, and more constructive than a “hear me roar” I may have also listened.

Before I get carried away – which would be easy in this case – I’ll leave you with a few more comments from my colleagues, which really sum up the breadth of issues and takes on the matter.

Mark Belinsky, Founder and Co-Director of Digital Democracy and a new media strategy consultant with his company New Words, put his thoughts on his blog, well worth reading (“Notes on Wikileaks,” a few snippets of which I’ve place below):

“Julian’s point, which I agree with, is often that newspapers are failing because of bad journalism. How many stories has Wikileaks broken vs the Times. Or the Guardian. Combined. And as budget cuts increase, it allows for good journalism to emerge from Global Voices and other interesting new projects.

This disruptive media source is something that western governments are now struggling with. I’ve been speaking with members of EU Parliament about it and have even presented to US Congress on the subject. Pinning the internet to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as Secretary Clinton did in her “Internet Freedom” speech was a bold move, but not one entirely based in reality. There is a lack of general consensus as to the nature of these right, making it hard to implement policy after the fact of making a strong declaration. The US needs allies in this battle in sympathetic governments (and vice-versa since so many tools are built here), but there’s a lack of consistency with what’s happening across the pond….

….After all, even an internet based-system is not “stateless.” It is bound by servers and wiring, of which only a few people know. And only a few lawyers know the legal frame that allows it to exist through the cables and servers of a handful of friendly States. In this sense it continues to be “centralized” even if the system for leaking itself is distributed and protected.”

From Josh Goldstein, who writes over at In An African Minute:

“Reality is far too complex for the 20th century institutions we are burdened with. How can a government, or even a small number of new and old style journos that make up the media elite, possibly claim a monopoly on truth in a situation as complicated as Afghanistan. Wikileaks matters because it will provide the raw content for those of us who are conceiving of new ways to interpret the world…..

Money quote from the New Yorker article Mark points us towards:

“He had come to understand the defining human struggle not as left versus right, or faith versus reason, but as individual versus institution. As a student of Kafka, Koestler, and Solzhenitsyn, he believed that truth, creativity, love, and compassion are corrupted by institutional hierarchies, and by “patronage networks”—one of his favorite expressions—that contort the human spirit. He sketched out a manifesto of sorts, titled “Conspiracy as Governance,” which sought to apply graph theory to politics. Assange wrote that illegitimate governance was by definition conspiratorial—the product of functionaries in “collaborative secrecy, working to the detriment of a population.” He argued that, when a regime’s lines of internal communication are disrupted, the information flow among conspirators must dwindle, and that, as the flow approaches zero, the conspiracy dissolves. Leaks were an instrument of information warfare…..”

John Rahaghi, a former active duty military member and current reservist, offers his take on the situation:

“I think this was a clear demonstration of contempt for the government, among other things. Many people have noted the leak hasn’t revealed alot of new information, at least so far.  Then why do this? Were there war crimes exposed?  Possibly, (I’m sure we’ll find out).  Were there 90,000 of them?  What was the whistle blown on?  That we are in a war?  That its conduct has gone poorly?  That we have differences with allies?  Is this an indictment of government secrecy in any form, the fact we have a military at all, or some combination of other factors?  Maybe its an attack on the very structure of the government altogether.   A leak this massive doesn’t lend itself to any simple explanation, at least for me. In the military, you are supposed to take the oath and follow lawful orders.  Ostensibly, if you see something that you feel is egregiously wrong, illegal, unethical, immoral, or whatever the case is as you see it, you bring it to the attention of the chain of command, the JAG corps, or your civilian leadership.  Naturally, this can be difficult, but this wasn’t a leak of an incident or pattern of behavior, it was years of classified documents covering many areas and I personally don’t think this was a credible way to change policy, if that was even the intent.

While you can talk about government secrecy as a separate topic itself, I think its important to understand some things about classified documents and the negative effects that can result from their disclosure.  JFK conspiracies, UFOs, or specs for a new death ray aren’t the only topics under confidential and Top Secret. The majority of what is classified is not as super cool as people think and I would bet seems innocuous or even obvious to a casual observer. I’d wager many people would read these documents and think whats the big deal, I knew that/guessed that/assumed that. But anything about tactics, sources, methods, operational details, assessments, and mission planning, to name a few, are in fact valuable to an enemy even years afterward.  Airing the fact that we have doubts about allies only complicates matters further (the State Dept cables could be an even bigger bombshell), and even something widely known in the press can take on different meaning when its seen to be the official thought or assessment of the U.S. government.  These are broad strokes and I suppose someone may not care about any of it because of how they feel about the conflicts, conduct, and administration etc.”

Ben Mazzotta transferred his discussion over to his blog post, which is well worth reading.  A few of his thoughts to wet your appetite (definitely read the rest of his piece if you’re interested in the topic):

“Graph theory or no graph theory, Assange’s intent here is to wage war on the Obama Administration, by attacking the American public’s political will to continue the fight. He is specifically opposed to the policy of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with disregard for the law he attempts to bring about a change to the Administration’s stated policy. Let’s grant him that the information is too cold to be acutely dangerous in a tactical sense, although that’s another argument worth having….

…Imagine if your small business was targeted, or if Google were targeted, or if Lockheed Martin were targeted by a similar disclosure of thousands of internal reports and communications not intended for public release. The damage to shareholders and management would be immense, partly because of the sheer irresponsibility of the leak per se, and then again from regulatory penalties, civil liability, and ruined corporate strategy. Malicious disclosure in business and government goes by the same name: espionage. In private life it can end marriages, friendships, and careers. The fact that the adversary here is The Man does not change the character of this leak….

This disclosure is a watershed event. It drives home the ease with which any individual can compromise the boundary between internal and public information. Actions of this type can undermine American strategy in the war. Political decisions about partnerships have tactical consequences, witness the importance of Turkish air bases in 2003.

In order to applaud Wikileaks for its role in this disclosure, I believe you have to hold two opinions. First, that the injustice of the Afghan war is so immense that citizens have a responsibility to bring about its immediate end, through civil disobedience or comparable means. Second, that Wikileaks is well qualified to assess the potential harm that might be inflicted as a result of the disclosures. You have to make up your own minds about the ethics of the Afghan war. On the second question, though, I invite you to think carefully through the wisdom of giving unaccountable, private organizations the power to disclose stolen, sensitive information based solely on their judgment that the benefit outweighs the harm. Can you reconcile the indiscriminate, voluminous, and quotidien nature of the leak with a story about plucky and righteous individuals bending unjust government to their will? To me, the leak betrays haste, youth and passion. I cannot buy into Assange’s vision of a world without confidentiality or privacy.

I don’t buy the Robin Hood argument here, and I don’t see this as a Tank Man moment.”

Chrissy Martin got into some of the implications on journalism (of which there are many in this case!)

“I think this raises interesting questions regarding the interaction between new media and traditional journalism.  Julian basically decided to do the newspapers the favor of offering them access first, a decision that I think was better for everyone involved because it allowed the documents to be vetted and analyzed before being released to the wider public.  But a decision that was not required, or enforceable, and may not happen the next time around.

This a case where regulation cannot keep up with technology, a situation that we are now seeing on an increasingly regular basis.  I am all for open government, transparency, citizen journalism.  However, I also think that the dissemination of information and how it is presented is a vital and often overlooked aspect of open initiatives.  Is it really a service to post a mass of information that may or not be true, as with intelligence reports that might have already been determined to be misinformation, but are not marked as such when posted on the internet?”

If you’re curious about some history of leaks in general, Mary Joyce put up a good post over at the MAP site (which she added to our discussion as well).

I’d love there to be further discussion in the comments below.  What do you think about the whole affair?  Who’s right?  Who’s wrong?  Who’s effected and how?

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HubSpot TV and discussion on Digital Activism, Social Media and Girls in Tech

I was on the 6 November episode of HubSpot TV discussing social media news, DigiActive/digital activism and Girls in Tech.

You can get the full show notes on the HubSpot Blog.

I’ll be on HubSpot TV on Friday, talking about digital activism

I’ll be the guest on this week’s HubSpot TV.  You can live stream the event (see the site for details), or you can come down to the offices in Cambridge for some chit chat and good food from the Lansdowne Pub.

I’ll be talk about topics of digital activism and some of the work I do with DigiActive.

DigiActive Policy Memo to the US Helsinki Commission

DigiActive has been asked to present a policy memo (it’s first) to the US Helsinki Commission on the effects of US embargoes on digital activism.  Colleagues Mary Joyce, Andreas Jungherr and Daniel Schultz compiled their recommendations, presented at a recent Congressional hearing.  The key points were:

In the digital age, where a “good” is a string of code that can be delivered anywhere in the world with the click of a mouse, even today’s smart sanctions are not smart enough.  By preventing access to blogging platforms, social networks, and other types of new media, current embargo policies harm the very activists who are furthering our common goals of democracy promotion, while leaving authoritarian governments free to spread propaganda through a range of state-controlled media outlets.

The full version is below and can also be found on the DigiActive website.  You can download the .pdf here.

Not Smart Enough:
How America’s “Smart” Sanctions Harm the World’s Digital Activists

by Mary Joyce, Andreas Jungherr and Daniel Schultz[1]
The DigiActive Working Group on Sanction Reform for the Digital Age

A Wave of Attacks on the World’s Digital Activists

In the winter and spring of this year, a wave of attacks on digital activists began. In Zimbabwe, the web site of one the nation’s strongest pro-democracy groups, Kubatana, was threatened with being shut down. In Belarus, another pro-democracy web site, this one representing the Belarussian American Association, received the same threat. In February bloggers in Iran received a similar notice that their blogs would be suspended, this in spite of research by the Harvard Berkman Center for Internet and Society that the Iranian blogosphere is a vibrant arena for both supporters and opponents of the current regime. In Sudan, aid workers are unable to download Google Earth and its “Crisis in Darfur” map, which would give them important information on sites of violence. In April users in Syria were temporarily blocked from using the social network LinkedIn, though social networks have played an important role in organizing grassroots citizen movements in countries from Egypt and Morocco to Colombia.

… Perpetrated by United States’ Embargo Policies

Who was behind this wave of attacks? Was it President Mugabe? President Lukashenko? President Assad? No. The perpetrator of these attacks on pro-democracy activists was none other than the United States government and American companies adhering to its embargo regimes.

The United States has several embargo regimes related both to particular products (such as encryption software) and to individuals. These sanctions were designed to protect US interests while limiting the effect of these measures to our nation’s enemies. Yet in the digital age, where a “good” is a string of code that can be delivered anywhere in the world with the click of a mouse, even today’s smart sanctions are not smart enough. By preventing access to blogging platforms, social networks, and other types of new media, current embargo policies harm the very activists who are furthering our common goals of democracy promotion, while leaving authoritarian governments free to spread propaganda through a range of state-controlled media outlets.

… With American Firms Caught in an Untenable Position

These embargo policies leave American firms in a difficult position. Overwhelmed by a mass of overlapping sanctions, many take the most conservative position and simply cut off all clients in targeted countries, even though sanctions target only a few individuals. This was the policy of the Utah-based company Bluehost, which was responsible for cutting off users in Zimbabwe, Belarus, and Iran earlier this year. Especially in light of potential fines, Bluehost decided to play it safe by cutting off all users in embargoed countries, rather than constantly cross-check their users against Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) lists.

Though activists may be frustrated with this kind of corporate decision-making, it is consistent with the firm’s role as a profit-making entity. American companies may choose to promote ethical activity and protect activists in foreign nations, but this is hardly their purpose. When protecting activists means potentially running afoul of the US government, it is not surprising that many firms choose to cut off activists to protect shareholder interests.

New Embargo Policies for the Digital Age

In light of these private-sector realities, responsibility for protecting foreign democracy activists falls to the US government. DigiActive’s Working Group on Sanction Reform for the Digital Age recommends the following steps in order to bring about this reform:

  1. Creation of a Single Body of Software Regulations: Members of the government bodies responsible for promulgating sanctions should conduct a thorough review of all regulations and legislation related to embargoes on software including, but not limited to, the Commerce Department’s Export Administration Regulations and the sanctions programs maintained by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. This review would result in the creation of a single volume of software policies which, at a minimum, will make it easier for US firms to abide by current rules and, by clarifying their responsibilities, would allow them to follow the letter of the law rather than taking the unnecessarily conservative positions they are currently applying to avoid the risk of transgressing unclear embargo regulations.
  2. Stakeholder Review of Software Regulations: Once this single body of regulation is created, stakeholders should be invited to comment and suggest modifications to the existing rules. This stakeholder group should include, but not be limited to, representatives of the agencies responsible for promulgating and enforcing the sanctions, representatives of American firms who must abide by the sanctions, and experts in digital activism and democracy promotion.
  3. Promulgation of New Regulations: Based on this stakeholder review, DigiActive suggests that a new set of sanctions be promulgated that recognize 1) that software embargoes function quite differently than embargoes on physical goods 2) that any software embargo is highly susceptible to failure because of the ease in circumventing online blocks to digital goods and 3) that access to new media tools is a great benefit to democracy activists, who lack other means of organization and message dissemination, while being of little use to authoritarian regimes, who have entire state apparatuses at their disposal.

We at the DigiActive Working Group on Sanction Reform for the Digital Age are optimistic about the positive outcome of this process and would like to offer our continuing assistance. You may contact us through our web site at www.DigiActive.org .

[1] This policy memo was originally written for a Congressional briefing panel before the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (October 22, 2009)

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DigiActive Post: Iranian elections, Information Passing and Twitter

I posted analysis on the Iranian election Twitter phenomenon and its effects on the future of information dissemination on the DigiActive blog.

Earlier this week, amidst travel and trying really hard to work, I followed the events of what was happening in Iran post-election.  I followed it all on Twitter.

There are many comments I could make on the events, but I wanted to highlight something that will be important for how information and participation happens in the months and years to come.

The fact is, we are all becoming a larger part of the information dissemination mechanisms that were once reserved for formal media channels.  DigiActive has reported many instances of citizen journalism, on-the-ground reporting and information gathering, but now we’re talking about the addition of a process of broader dissemination.

Visit DigiActive for the full post.

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Documenting Kenya’s Election Using Crisis Mapping Techniques

I’m going to repost this research write up that has been over at the Other Side blog for several months.  It was originally posted on 28 October 2008.  Eventually I’ll be posting some of my better posts from OSG over here as well.

What are citizen journalists’ roles in documenting conflict and are those roles becoming more important?

Led by Patrick Meier, a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, I’m happy to report that we’ve just completed the first of (hopefully) several case studies this case study will attempt to answer this question more concretely.

Supported by Humanity United, the project seeks to explore the changing role and impact of information communication technology in crisis early warning and humanitarian response. The eventual goal is to identify ways in which citizen journalists and new communications tools can work more effectively in crisis situations.

Patrick did a really good job of writing up the methodology at his blog, so I’m going to leave wheel inventing up to him.

The exciting thing for me was to see the way in which new media tools were being used by citizen journalists, specifically how much more effective they seemed to be in disseminating on-the-ground, real-time information than the mainstream media was. The effects of efforts like Ushahidi also contain incredibly valuable information for future research.

Our preliminary findings:

  • Mainstream media reported actual death count before citizen journalists; however, on many accounts, mainstream media did not report on incidents leading to actual deaths, i.e., early warning signs;
  • Citizen journalist reports and Ushahidi reports did not overlap geographically with mainstream media reports;
  • Citizen journalists tended to report as soon as violence started, well before mainstream media;
  • The number of comments on citizen journalist blogs increased during the 30-day period, or during particular periods of violence;
  • The comment section was also used as a medium for real-time updating;
  • Many citizen journalist bloggers used real-time updates sent to them via SMS, primarily from rural areas;
  • Citizen journalism reports declined after the launch of Ushahidi;
  • Ushahidi reports document an important number of violent events not reported by the mainstream media and citizen journalists;
  • Contrary to news media and citizen journalist reports, Ushahidi data always had specific location information;
  • Ushahidi reports also covered a wider geographical area than both mainstream news and citizen journalist bloggers.

For further information on our project’s methodology and sources, please see this short powerpoint presentation (pdf) which we have also uploaded on Slideshare. For more on crisis mapping, please see this page.

Some follow up questions that we identified as being interesting off-shoots of this project are:

  1. What was the role of SMS messaging in the overall information chain? How does it differ across the country (rural vs urban) and what are some of the most effective ways that this medium was (or could be) used?
  2. What was the role of blogs in mainstream media information gathering? Were they a resource? What about Human Rights organizations? If so, is there anything we can learn about how to make that information more effective in terms of crisis response?
  3. Can efforts such as Ushahidi be replicated in other areas, or have there been similar efforts?

We hope to refine the process as we move forward, and with that being said, we’d love feedback as possible on both methodology and analysis, as well as the visualization. We’re looking to clean the whole package up moving forward, so this would be very helpful.

Our next case study will be Georgia. Please contact me if you’re interested in joining the team.

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DigiActive Post: Moldovan Protests – Was it really a “Twitter Revolution”?

A synopsis of the social media impact on the protests in Moldova that occurred in early April 2009.

source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/creepysleepy/3429118253/

source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/creepysleepy/3429118253/

Since Tuesday’s protests and riots in the Moldovan capital Chisinau, there has been much analysis on how this group of protesters was formed.  Initial reports focused primarily on the use of Twitter, while paying scant reference to other social media tools, let alone the still relevant power of human mobilization.  The extent to which Twitter has been connected to the event has even led to unfortunate outcomes such as the charging of Natalia Morar, a Moldovan activist blamed for starting the “revolution” using the application.

The analysis on the technological aspects of this event in the past few days have revealed a different story.  It still involves Twitter, but Twitter has a different role.  While Twitter had a part in the pre-protest mobilization in and around Chisinau on Monday night, it may not have necessarily turned the protests into mobs or rioters, nor did it necessarily invoke the violence that occurred on Tuesday, as some believe.

Visit the DigiActive blog for the full post.

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DigiActive Post: Guide – Quick ‘n Easy Guide to Online Advocacy

Title: Quick ‘n Easy Guide to Online Advocacy

Author: Tactical Technology Collective

Published By: Collective Commons (2009)

What is it?: This guide offers ways to use social networking and web 2.0 tools to improve advocacy campaigns.  It aims to expose advocates to online services that are quick to use and easy to understand.

Visit DigiActive for the full post.

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DigiActive Post: Campaign – Homeless Nation offers a place to tell stories and interact

Description: Homeless Nation was started by Daniel Cross, a documentary filmmaker who has highlighted Canada’s homeless population in several of his films. While gathering thousands of stories given by the homeless, most of which wouldn’t fit into the films, Cross envisioned a space where these reports wouldn’t be lost……

Visit DigiActive for the full post.

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DigiActive Post: Book Review – Activists and Innovation

Please visit the DigiActive blog for a book review of Market Rebels: How Activists Make or Break Radical Innovations, by Hayagreeva Rao.

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